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Abstract—In this letter, we investigate the problem of dynamic
spectrum access for small cell networks, using a graphical game
approach. Compared with existing studies, we take the features
of different cell loads and local interference relationship into
account. It is proved that the formulated spectrum access game
is an exact potential game with the aggregate interference level
as the potential function, and Nash equilibrium (NE) of the
game corresponds to the global or local optima of the original
optimization problem. A lower bound of the achievable aggregate
interference level is rigorously derived. Finally, we propose
an autonomous best response learning algorithm to converge
towards its NE. It is shown that the proposed game-theoretic
solution converges rapidly and its achievable performance is close
to the optimum solution.
Index Terms—5G networks, small cell networks, dynamic
spectrum access, potential game.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMALL cell is an enabling technology for 5G networks,since it has been regarded as the most promising approach
for providing a thousand-fold mobile traffic over the next
decade [1]. Technically, the use of very dense and low-power
small cells exploits the following two fundamental effects [2]:
i) the decreasing distance between the base station and the
user leads to higher transmission rates, and ii) the spectrum
is more efficiently exploited due to the improved spectrum
spatial reuse ratio. As the network becomes denser, temp-
spatial variations of mobile traffics can be observed and
the small cells are usually deployed randomly and dynam-
ically [3]. As a result, traditional centralized optimization
approaches, e.g., the graph coloring algorithm [4], can not be
applied in practice. To overcome this shortage, there are some
distributed spectrum access approaches using, e.g., sensing-
based access approach [5], utility-based learning approach
[6], reinforcement-learning based self-organizing scheme [7],
coalitional game based scheme [8], evolutionary game based
scheme [9] and hierarchical dynamic game approach [10].
However, there are two limitations in existing distributed
approaches: i) the fact that the small cells have different loads
was not addressed, i.e., most existing work assumed that there
is only one mobile user in each small cell, and ii) the feature
of local interference due to the low transmission power, e.g.,
the transmission of a small cell only directly affects its nearby
cells, was not considered. In this letter, we consider load-aware
dynamic spectrum access for small cell networks, taking into
account different cell loads and local interference relationship.
We consider a sensing-based autonomous spectrum access
mechanism, i.e., a small cell transmits on the channels which
are detected idle [5]. In such scenarios, it is desirable to
decrease the number of neighboring cells choosing the same
channel. We first define a new optimization metric to capture
the interference among the small cells. Then, we formulate
the spectrum access problem as a graphical game and propose
a self-organizing distributed spectrum access algorithm. To
summarize, the contributions of this letter are:
1) We formulate the spectrum access problem for the
small cells as a graphical game, taking the inherent
features of different cell loads and local interference
relationship into account. It is proved that it is an exact
potential game with the aggregate interference level as
the potential function; furthermore, the Nash equilibrium
(NE) of the game corresponds to the global or local
optima of the original problem. Also, a lower bound of
the aggregate interference level is rigorously derived.
2) We propose an autonomous best response (BR) algo-
rithm to converge towards NE of the game. Compared
with the standard BR algorithm, the proposed algorithm
converges rapidly and is scalable when the number of
small cells becomes large. Simulation results show that
its performance is very close to the global optimum.
Note that game-based spectrum access approaches have
been extensively used in the literature [6]–[12]. In method-
ology, the differences and new challenges in this work are: i)
in existing work, it is assumed that there is only one serving
mobile user in each cell and the task is to choose an operational
channel. When different cell loads are considered, each cell
generally needs multiple channels rather than one channel.
However, existing game design and analysis with singleton
action selection can not be applied. ii) we consider a graphical
game model, i.e., the direct interaction only exists between
neighboring users, and hence is significantly different from
previous global interactive game models, i.e., the interaction
emerges among all users, iii) we define a new metric to capture
the interference relationship among neighboring small cells.
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model and problem formulation are presented.
In Section III, the graphical game model is formulated and
analyzed, and an autonomous best response learning algorithm
is proposed to achieve its NE. Finally, simulation results and
discussion are presented in Section IV and conclusion is drawn
in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a small cell network consisting of N small cell
access points (SAPs) and each SAP serves several mobile
2users (MUs). It is assumed that the small cells and the
macro-cell operate on orthogonal channels, and hence the
main optimization objective is eliminating mutual interference
among the small cells. Note that this assumption has been
extensively used in previous work [4], [6], [13]–[15]. Also, it is
in line with 3GPP [16] and particularly represents the scenarios
in the LTE-U network [17], which is an active research topic.
There are M channels available for the SAPs. Denote the
SAP set as N , i.e., N = {1, . . . , N}, and the available channel
set as M, i.e., M = {1, . . . ,M}. It is shown that as the small
cells become denser in 5G networks, the more spatial load
fluctuation is observed by each SAP [2]. To capture such a
fluctuation, it is assumed that each SAP chooses Kn channels
for data transmission of the MUs. The number Kn can be
regarded as the load of each SAP, which is jointly determined
by the number of active MUs and their traffic demands1.
Similar to previous work [6], [11], [12], we focus on the
spectrum access problem and do not consider the problem of
optimizing the required number of channels of each SAP. In
practice, some simple but efficient approaches, e.g., the one
proposed in [13], can be applied to estimate the cell load.
Due to the spatial distribution and lower transmission power
of SAPs, the transmission of a small cell only directly affects
the neighboring small cells [4], [13], [14], [18]. To charac-
terize the interference relationship among the small cells, the
following interference graph is introduced. Specifically, if the
distance dij between SAP i and j is lower than a threshold d0,
then they interfere with each other when transmitting on the
same channel. Therefore, the potential interference relation-
ship can be captured by an interference graph G = {V,E},
where V is the vertex set (the SAP set) and E is the edge set,
i.e., V = {1, . . . , N} and E = {(i, j)|i ∈ N , j ∈ N , dij <
d0}. For presentation, denote the neighboring SAP set of SAP
n as Jn, i.e., Jn = {j ∈ N : dnj < d0}.
If two or more neighboring small cells choose the same
channel, mutual interference may occur. Thus, in order to
mitigate interference among the small cells, it is desirable
to allocate non-overlapping channels for them as soon as
possible. Denote the choice of channels by SAP n as an =
{c1, c2, . . . , cKn}, ci ∈ M, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ Kn. Note that an is a
Kn-combination of M and the number of all possible chosen
channel profiles of player n is CKnM =
M(M−1)...(M−Kn+1)
Kn(Kn−1)...1
.
Motivated by the graph coloring for spectrum allocation
problems [4], we define the experienced interference level as
following:
sn =
∑
j∈Jn
∑
e∈an
∑
f∈aj
δ(e, f), (1)
where δ(e, f) is the following indicator function:
δ(e, f) =
{
1, e = f
0, e 6= f.
(2)
That is, if two selected channels e and f are the same, then
the indication function takes one; otherwise, it takes zero.
1Furthermore, since the users in the small cells are always random and
dynamic, it is not reasonable to allocate spectrum resources based on the
instantaneous network state; instead, it is preferable to allocate spectrum
resources according to their loads in a relatively longer decision period.
Small cell 1 Small cell 2 Small cell 3
Small cell 4
Fig. 1. An illustration for the considered interference model, in which
different colors represent different channels. To reduce the interference in the
network, i) for intra-cell spectrum access, it is mandatory to allocate different
channels for the users in the same cell, ii) for inter-cell spectrum access, the
number of overlapping channels should be minimized. According to (1), the
interference levels of the cells are s1 = 1, s2 = 3, s3 = 2, s4 = 0.
The rationale behind the experienced interference level
is briefly explained as follows: in autonomous small cell
networks, a small cell transmits only when the received energy
on the dedicated channel is below a threshold. This is similar
to the carrier sense multiple access and has been regarded as a
proposing approach for cognitive small cell networks [5] and
LTE-U small cells [17]. Therefore, decreasing the number of
interfering cells would increase the achievable throughput.
Note that sn is the number of channels also chosen by the
neighboring SAPs. For an individual SAP n, the interference
level sn should be minimized. From a network-centric per-
spective, the aggregate interference level of all the SAPs, i.e.,∑
n∈N sn should be minimized. The considered interference
model is illustratively depicted in Fig. 1. Thus, we formulate
the problem of load-aware spectrum allocation for cognitive
small cell networks as follows:
P1 : min
∑
n∈N
sn. (3)
It is noted that the definition of the interference model
is different from that of traditional PHY-layer interference.
Here, the interference level is used to characterize the mutual
influence among neighboring SAPs from a higher-level view.
Such an interference model has also been applied for single
channel selection in opportunistic spectrum access networks
[19]–[21]. In comparison, this work extends previous single
channel selection to load-aware multiple channel access. With
the allocated channels, the small cell can perform power con-
trol to further reduce the mutual interference among different
cells. However, this problem is beyond the scope of this letter.
III. GRAPHICAL GAME MODEL AND DISTRIBUTED
LEARNING ALGORITHM
To implement self-organizing and distributed spectrum ac-
cess, we formulate a graphical game model to address the local
interference relationship among the cells. The game is proved
to be an exact potential game, and then a distributed learning
algorithm is proposed to achieve its Nash equilibria.
A. Graphical Game for Dynamic Spectrum Access
Formally, the spectrum access game is denoted as F =
[N ,G, {An}n∈N , {un}n∈N ], where N = {1, . . . , N} is a set
of players (small cells), G is the potential interference graph
3among the players, An = {1, . . . ,M} is a set of the available
actions (channels) for each player n, and un is the utility
function of player n. Due to the limited interference range,
the utility function can be expressed as un(an, aJn), where
an is the action of player n and aJn is the action profile of
the neighboring players of n. Thus, the formulated spectrum
access game belongs to graphical game. As discussed before,
each small cell prefers a lower interference level, which
motivates us to define the utility function as follows:
un(an, aJn) = −sn, (4)
where sn is the experienced interference level of player n, as
characterized by (1). The players in the game are selfish and
rational to maximize their individual utilities, i.e.,
(F) : max
an∈An
un(an, aJn), ∀n ∈ N . (5)
To analyze the properties of the formulated spectrum access
game, we first present the following definitions.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium [22]). An action profile
a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
N ) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE)
if and only if no player can improve its utility by deviating
unilaterally, i.e.,
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥ un(an, a
∗
Jn), ∀n ∈ N , ∀an ∈ An, an 6= a
∗
n
(6)
Definition 2 (Exact potential game [22]). A game is an
exact potential game (EPG) if there exists an ordinal potential
function φ : A1 × · · · ×AN → R such that for all n ∈ N , all
an ∈ An, and a′n ∈ An, the following holds:
un(an, aJn)− un(a
′
n, aJn) = φ(an, aJn)− φ(a
′
n, aJn)
(7)
In other words, the change in the utility function caused by the
unilateral action change of an arbitrary player is exactly the
same with that in the potential function. It is known that EPG
admits the following two promising features: (i) every EPG
has at least one pure strategy NE, and (ii) an action profile
that maximizes the potential function is also a NE.
Theorem 1. The formulated spectrum access game F is an
EPG, which has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
In addition, the global optima of problem P1 are pure strategy
Nash equilibria of F .
Proof: To prove this theorem, we first construct the
following potential function:
Φ(an, a−n) = −
1
2
∑
n∈N
sn(a1, . . . , aN ), (8)
where sn is characterized by (1).
Recalling that the chosen channels of player n is denoted
as an = {c1, c2, . . . , cKn}, define In(ci, aJn) as the set of
neighboring players choosing a channel ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ Kn, i.e.,
In(ci, aJn) = {j ∈ Jn : ci ∈ aj}, (9)
where Jn is the neighbor set of player n. Then, we denote
sn(ci, aJn) = |In(ci, aJn)| (10)
as the experienced interference level on channel ci, where |A|
is the cardinality of set A, i.e., the number of elements in |A|.
Accordingly, the aggregate experienced interference level of
player n is also given by:
sn(an, aJn) =
∑
e∈an
sn(e, aJn) (11)
Now, suppose that an arbitrary player n unilaterally changes
its channel selection from an = {c1, c2, . . . , cKn} to a∗n =
{c∗1, c
∗
2, . . . , c
∗
Kn
}. For presentation, we classify the channels
into the following three sets:
• C0 = an ∩ a∗n. That is, the channels in set C0 are chosen
by player n both before and after its unilateral action
change. Note that C0 may be a null set.
• C1 = an\{an∩a∗n}, where A\B means that B is excluded
from A. That is, the channels in C1 are only chosen by
player n before its unilateral action change.
• C2 = a∗n\{an ∩ a
∗
n}. That is, the channels in C2 are only
chosen by player n after its unilateral action change.
From the above classification, the change in utility function
of player n caused by its action unilateral action change is
given by:
un(a
∗
n, aJn)−un(an, aJn) =
∑
e∈C1
sn(e, aJn)−
∑
e∈C2
sn(e, aJn)
(12)
Also, the change in the potential function caused by the
unilateral change of player n is as follows:
Φ(a∗n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n)
= 12
{
un(a
∗
n, aJn)− un(an, aJn)
+
∑
k∈D1
{
uk(ak, a
∗
Jk
)− uk(ak, aJk)
}
+
∑
k∈D2
{
uk(ak, a
∗
Jk
)− uk(ak, aJk)
}
+
∑
k∈D3,k 6=n
{
uk(ak, a
∗
Jk
)− uk(ak, aJk)
}}
,
(13)
where D1 = ∪
e∈C1
In(e, aJn), D2 = ∪
e∈C2
In(e, aJn), D3 =
N\{D1∪D2}, and uk(ak, a∗Jk) is the utility function of player
k after n’s unilateral action change. Note that player n belongs
to the neighboring player set of player k, i.e., n ∈ Jk . Since
the action of player n only affects its neighboring players, the
following equations hold:
un(ak, a
∗
Jk
)− un(ak, aJk) = 1, ∀k ∈ D1 (14)
un(ak, a
∗
Jk
)− un(ak, aJk) = −1, ∀k ∈ D2 (15)
un(ak, a
∗
Jk
)− un(ak, aJk) = 0, ∀k ∈ D3, k 6= n (16)
Based on (14) and (15), we have∑
k∈D1
{
uk(ak, a
∗
Jk
)− uk(ak, aJk)
}
= |D1| =
∑
e∈C1
sn(e, aJn)
(17)∑
k∈D2
{
uk(ak, a
∗
Jk
)−uk(ak, aJk)
}
= −|D2| = −
∑
e∈C2
sn(e, aJn)
(18)
Now, combining (12), (16), (17) and (18) yields the following
equation:
Φ(a∗n, a−n)− Φ(an, a−n) = un(a
∗
n, a−n)− un(an, a−n),
(19)
4which satisfies the definition of EPG, as characterized by
(7). Thus, the formulated spectrum access game F is an
EPG, which has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, according to the relationship between the poten-
tial function and the network-centric optimization objective,
Theorem 1 is proved.
Theorem 2. For any network topology, the aggregate inter-
ference level of all the players at any NE point is bounded by
U(aNE) ≥ −
∑
n∈N
∑
j∈Jn
KnKj
M
.
Proof: For any pure strategy NE aNE = (a∗1, . . . , a∗N ), the
following inequality holds for each player n, ∀n ∈ N :
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥ un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn), ∀a¯n ∈ An, a¯n 6= a
∗
n, (20)
which is obtained according to the definition given in (6).
Based on (20), it follows that:
CKnM × un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥
∑
a¯n∈An
un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn), (21)
where CKnM is the number of Kn-combinations of the
channel set An (Note that |An| = M ). It is seen that∑
a¯n∈An
un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn
) represents the aggregate experienced
interference level of player n as if it would access all possible
channel profiles simultaneously while the neighboring users
still only transmit on their chosen channels. As a result, it can
be calculated as follows:
∑
a¯n∈An
un(a¯n, a
∗
Jn) = −C
Kn−1
M−1
∑
j∈Jn
Kj, (22)
where |Jn| is the number of neighboring users of user n. Thus,
equation (21) can be re-written as:
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥ −
CKn−1M−1
CKnM
∑
j∈Jn
Kj = −
1
M
∑
j∈Jn
KnKj,
(23)
Finally, it follows that:
U(aNE) =
∑
n∈N
un(a
∗
n, a
∗
Jn) ≥ −
∑
n∈N
∑
j∈Jn
KnKj
M
(24)
which proves Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 characterizes the achievable interference bound
of the formulated spectrum access game. Some further discus-
sions are given below:
• If all the players choose only one channel for trans-
mission, i.e., Kn = 1, ∀n ∈ N , we have U(aNE) ≥
−
∑
n∈N
|Jn|
M
.
• When the number of available channels increases, the
bounded aggregate interference level decreases. In partic-
ular, if the number of channels becomes sufficiently large,
i.e., M → ∞, we have U(aNE) → 0. In this case, the
spectrum resources are abundant and mutual interference
among the players are completely eliminated. Also, when
the network becomes sparse, i.e., decreasing |Jn|, the
bounded aggregate interference level also decreases.
Fig. 2. The illustrative diagram of the proposed autonomous best response
learning algorithm. Using the autonomous contention mechanism, users 1 and
5 can update channel selections simultaneously.
B. Autonomous best response learning
As the distributed spectrum access problem now formulated
as an exact potential game, the best response (BR) algorithm
[22] can be applied to achieve Nash equilibria of the game.
However, there is a limitation of standard BR algorithm: only
one player is randomly selected to update its action in each
iteration. However, the convergence speed is very slow when
the network becomes dense. To overcome this problem, we
exploit the local interference of small cell networks, and
propose an autonomous best response learning algorithm,
which converges to the NE rapidly.
The key idea that multiple users are autonomously selected
to update their selections simultaneously. Specifically, due
to the local interference among the users, multiple non-
neighboring can using the BR rule to update their channel
selections [23]. To achieve this, we assume that there is
a common control channel (CCC) available and a 802.11
DCF-like contention mechanism can be applied at each CR
user. Specifically, each SAP has three states: free, active, and
inactive, as shown in Fig. 2, and only the active users have
the opportunities to update their channel selections. A brief
description of the state transition is as follows:
• A free SAP generates a backoff timer according to
uniform distribution on an interval, say [0, τmax] for some
fixed parameter τmax. If the backoff timer expires, it
becomes active. Then, it broadcasts an updating request
message (URM).
• If a free SAP hears a URM before its backoff timer
expires, it freezes the timer immediately, enters into the
inactive state, and responds with an updating announce
message (UAM).
• If a free SAP hears a UAM before its backoff timer
expires, it also freezes the timer immediately, enters into
inactive state, and keep silent until the next period.
• When an active SAP receives a UAM from its neighbors,
it updates their channel selection using the BR rule. After
the updating, it broadcasts a channel updating message
(CUM) to announce its new channel selection, and they
becomes free again.
• On hearing a CUM message, the inactive users turn to
be free again.
5Algorithm 1: Autonomous best response algorithm
1). Initialization: All the users exchange information (the
channel selection) with its neighbors.
2). All SAPs repeatedly perform the following procedure:
Based on the information of its neighbors, each SAP n
finds the best action selection n as follows:
a(b)n (i− 1) = arg max
an∈An
un(an, aJn(i − 1)), (25)
where aJn(i − 1) is the action profiles of its neighboring
SAPs in the (i − 1)th iteration. That is, SAP n finds the
action a(b)n (i − 1) that maximizes its utility function given
the action profiles of the neighboring SAPs.
if a(b)n (i−1) is better than the current selection an(i−1),
SAP n contends for an updating opportunity and updates its
channel selection as ak(i) = a(b)k (i− 1) if the contention is
successful; otherwise, it keeps silent.
Theorem 3. The proposed autonomous best response learning
algorithm converges to a pure strategy NE point of the
formulated spectrum access game F in finite steps. Therefore,
the aggregate interference level in the small cell networks is
globally or locally minimized.
Proof: From the learning procedure, it is seen that each
updating user always makes its utility function increasing. As
the updating users are non-neighboring, the potential function
of the game, as specified by (8), is increasing. Since the
potential function is up bounded (the maximum value is zero),
the learning algorithm will finally converge to a global or local
maximum point of the potential function in finite steps. Thus,
Theorem 3 is proved.
Surely, we can achieve the global optimal solutions as
the potential function coincides with the objective function
of the centralized problem P1, using the spatial adaptive
play [20] or B-logit learning [21]. However, the convergence
speed of the optional algorithms is slow. Therefore, to make
it more practically, it should balance the tradeoff between
convergence speed and performance, which is the motivation
of the proposed autonomous learning algorithm.
Remark. Some discussions on the practical implementa-
tions of the autonomous best response learning algorithm
are listed below: i) Note that it is assumed that the users
are truthful in exchanging information and are obedient in
executing the contention mechanism as well as the BR up-
date rule. In essence, the presented game-theoretic solution
follows the so-called ”engineering agenda” of game theory,
i.e., using games as a tool for distributed control [24]. ii)
only at the initialization phase, each SAP needs to know the
current channel selection profiles of neighboring SAPs. In
practice, information exchange among neighboring SAPs can
be achieved via the backhaul network or the X2 interference.
iii) as the algorithm begins to iterate, the users broadcast
their new selections in the CUM message, which means that
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Fig. 3. The convergence speed comparison between the standard BR and
the autonomous BR. (The number of channels is M = 5)
information exchange is not intentionally needed anymore.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We consider a small cell network deployed in a square
region. When there are 20 small cells, the square region is
200m × 200m. When the number of small cells increases,
the square region increases proportionally to keep the same
density. The coverage distance of each small cell is 20m, and
the interference distance is 60m. For presentation, the load of
each cell is randomly chosen from a load set L = {1, 2, 3}.
To begin with, we compare the convergence speed of the
autonomous BR and the standard BR. In the standard BR,
only one active user is scheduled to update its action in each
iteration, which can be achieved by token or a gateway. There
are five channels available in the network and the companion
results of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the it-
erations needed for converging are shown in Fig. 3. The results
are obtained by simulating five different network topologies
and 1000 independent trials for each network topology. It is
noted from the figure that for the same size network, e.g.,
N = 20 or N = 30, the iterations needed for converging of the
autonomous BR learning algorithm is significantly decreased.
Furthermore, when the network scales up from N = 20 to
N = 30, the convergence speed of the autonomous BR is
slightly decreased while that of the standard BR is largely
decreased. The reason is that multiple non-neighboring users
can update simultaneously. Thus, the proposed autonomous
BR algorithm is especially suitable for large-scale networks.
Secondly, the aggregate interference level when varying the
number of small cells is shown in Fig. 4. The best and worst
NE are obtained in a quasi-centralized manner. Specifically,
assume there is an omnipotent genie, which knows the cell
loads and the interference relation between the SAPs. We
run the standard BR learning algorithm 1000 times and then
choose the best (worst) result respectively. According to The-
orem 1, the best NE also serves as global minimum for the
formulated dynamic spectrum access game. It is noted from the
figure that as the network scale increases, the aggregate level
increases, as can be expected. More importantly, it is noted that
the performance of the proposed autonomous best response
algorithm is close to the optimum solution. Also, the game-
based solution significantly outperforms the random selection
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strategy. In addition, the aggregate interference level when
varying the number of channels is shown in Fig. 5. It is noted
that as the number of channels increases, the interference level
decreases as can be expected. In particular, as the number of
channels is large, e.g., M > 9, the interference level becomes
moderate. Moreover, the performance of the autonomous BR
algorithm is close to the optimum.
To summarize, the simulation results show that the proposed
game-theoretic converges rapidly and its performance is close
to the optimum solution. More importantly, it is scalable when
increasing the number of small cells, which means that it is
suitable in large-scale networks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we investigated the problem of self-organizing
spectrum access for small cell networks, using a graphical
game approach. Compared with existing work, we took the
features of different cell loads and local interference relation-
ship into account. It is proved that the formulated spectrum
access game is an exact potential game with the aggregate in-
terference level as the potential function, and Nash equilibrium
(NE) of the game corresponds to the global or local optima
of the original problem. Also, a lower bound of the aggregate
interference level was rigorously derived. Then, we proposed
an autonomous best response learning algorithm to converge
towards NE of the game. It is shown that the proposed learning
algorithm converges rapidly and its performance is close to the
optimum solution.
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